George Espinoza v. Cameron Lindsay by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-4-2012 
George Espinoza v. Cameron Lindsay 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"George Espinoza v. Cameron Lindsay" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 311. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/311 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
GLD-296       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1751 
___________ 
 
GEORGE ESPINOZA, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LINDSAY;  
UNIT MANAGER GATES; 
CASE MANAGER PASSMORE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00089) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 27, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 4, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 George Espinoza, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights action.  
2 
 
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s order.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Espinoza is a federal inmate at the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center 
(“Moshannon Valley”), a private correctional facility in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania.  
While incarcerated at Moshannon Valley, Espinoza sought to enroll in substance abuse 
treatment programs, such as the Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) and the 
Non-residential Drug Abuse Program (“NRDAP”).  Prison officials informed him that he 
was not eligible for those programs because he had been assigned a “Public Safety 
Factor” of “alien” due to an immigration detainer lodged against him. 
 In April 2011, Espinoza filed a complaint in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania against several Moshannon Valley employees (the 
“Moshannon Valley Defendants”), claiming that they had violated his rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment by denying him the opportunity to participate in drug and alcohol 
programs on the ground that he is an alien.  The Moshannon Valley Defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  A 
Magistrate Judge agreed with the defendants that Espinoza had failed to state a claim 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
1
  
                                              
1
 Because the Moshannon Valley Defendants are not state actors, the Magistrate Judge 
presumed that Espinoza intended to assert liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), instead of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  The Magistrate Judge also recognized, however, that it is not entirely clear 
whether the defendants could be subject to liability under Bivens either, as the Supreme 
Court has recently held that employees of private prisons operating under contract with 
the Bureau of Prisons—at least in the context of an Eighth Amendment claim—are not.  
See Minneci v. Pollard, -- U.S. --, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012) (refusing to imply the 
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The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation over 
Espinoza’s objections, granted the defendants’ motion, and dismissed the complaint.  
This appeal followed.  
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Dismissal is proper if a party fails to allege sufficient factual 
matter, which if accepted as true, could “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal presents no 
substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The District Court properly granted the Moshannon Valley Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.  First, as the Magistrate Judge explained, Espinoza’s allegations do not establish 
a plausible due process claim.  “[A]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to 
which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not 
otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject 
an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”  Hewitt v. Helms, 459 
U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Sandin v. 
                                                                                                                                                  
existence of a Bivens remedy where “a federal prisoner seeks damages from privately 
employed personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the conduct 
allegedly amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is of a 
kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law”).  The Magistrate 
Judge ultimately declined to resolve this issue in light of her determination that 
Espinoza’s allegations did not state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.  We will 
do the same.    
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Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), (stating that a protected liberty interest is “generally 
limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on 
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”).  Being classified as an 
alien, and thus disqualified from certain programs, is not outside what a prisoner “may 
reasonably expect to encounter as a result of his or her conviction in accordance with due 
process of law.”  Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted); see Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976) 
(explaining that prisoners have no legitimate due process concerns in their prison 
classifications).  The Magistrate Judge also correctly concluded that Espinoza failed to 
state an equal protection claim, as he did not allege facts that give rise to a plausible 
inference that the denial of substance abuse treatment was the result of purposeful 
discrimination.
2
  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-82.     
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 
this appeal.  See I.O.P. 10.6.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  Espinoza’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  
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 Espinoza also claimed that the defendants’ conduct violated 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), which 
provides substance abuse treatment programs for eligible prisoners.  We note, however, 
that inmates with detainers lodged against them are ineligible for such treatment if, as in 
Espinoza’s case, they would be unable to complete the community-based treatment phase 
of the program.  See McLean v, Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999).  Insofar 
as Espinoza claimed that the defendants’ conduct violated 28 C.F.R. § 551.90—which 
prohibits discrimination against inmates on the basis of race, religion, national origin, 
sex, disability, or political belief—and the corresponding BOP Policy Program 
Statement, we conclude that Espinoza has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim.   
 
